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The Waitangi Tribunal and the Regulation of Māori Protest 
Juan Tauri and Robert Webb 
 
 
Abstract 
Much of the current academic and political discourse related the development 
and operations of the Waitangi Tribunal over its first twenty years portray it as a 
forum that provided Māori with a meaningful avenue for settling Treaty 
grievances compared to the formal legal systems performance in the preceding 
100 years. In contrast, we argue that from its inception and throughout much of 
the 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal functioned primarily as an informal justice 
forum that assisted the New Zealand state’s regulation of Māori Treaty activism 
during the transition from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist mode of capital 
accumulation.   
 
Introduction 
Despite the political rhetoric of successive governments around 
partnership and a commitment to the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori Treaty rights 
remain contested, as represented in the contemporary moment in legislation 
such as the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. In this context, it is useful to 
reflect on an important period of Crown and Māori relations, a period that 
marked a shift in recognising longstanding Treaty rights through the 
development of a specific forum for reviewing Māori Treaty grievances - the 
Waitangi Tribunal.  The paper examines the important formation period of 
the Tribunal in the early 1970s to mid 1990s to illustrate two interrelated 
points: firstly the Tribunal's formation poses a contradiction in that while it 
represented the first meaningful examination of Crown breaches of Maori 
Treaty rights, it did so utilising an ‘informal’ review process that initially 
lacked the authority to impose binding decisions; and secondly that during 
this period the Tribunal encouraged the incorporation of Māori political and 
social activism into a government controlled forum.   
The establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal under the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 appeared to offer Māori a meaningful process for airing 
their Treaty grievances.  Until the Tribunal’s formation, Māori Treaty 
activism had been largely contained within the formal court processes of the 
justice system and governmental processes which decade upon decade 
denied recognition of Māori rights.   
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The paper focuses on two related questions: ‘why did the government 
develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in State/Māori relations’, and 
‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve at this point in State/Māori 
relations’?  We argue that the processes and mechanisms of the Tribunal 
constituted a form of regulation resulting from the shift from a Fordist to a 
Post-Fordist mode of capitalist accumulation in New Zealand from the late 
1970s.  More precisely, the formation of the Waitangi Tribunal and the first 
decade of its operation can be understood as a state-centred informal justice 
forum that assisted the state in regulating the potential hegemonic impact of 
Māori Treaty activism.   
The authors’ set out to contest claims that the Tribunal and its 
processes are evidence that the New Zealand state had sought to address 
Treaty grievances in a meaningful way, by providing Māori with a forum 
where they could ‘tell their stories of dispossession’ (Maaka & Fleras 2005; 
see later discussion on perspectives on the development and role of the 
Tribunal).  In contrast, we argue that although the regulation of Māori protest 
and Treaty grievances from the inception of the Tribunal may not have been 
as overt as those employed during the colonial context1, regulation existed 
nonetheless; albeit reconstituted to reflect the developing Post-Fordist 
economic and regulatory environment.  We use regulation theory as a 
theoretical and conceptual framework to describe the underlying socio-
political drivers behind the development of the Tribunal at a particular point 
in State/Māori relations. 
The decision to focus on the early period of the operations of the 
Tribunal (from 1975 to the late 1980s) was influenced firstly, by the fact that 
the establishment of the Tribunal signalled the first instance in which the 
state had organised a specific, institutionalised response to Māori activism 
after a long period of disengagement from Māori and their Treaty issues.  
Prior to that the Tribunal the Government had considered the Treaty a 
‘nullity’, and left it to the courts to mediate (and consistently) repudiate 
Māori claims.  And secondly, much of the material generated by academics 
and researchers on the Tribunal has focused on claims-making and the way 
in which the Tribunal dealt with claims and government responses to their 
                                                            
1  The colonial government legislated extensively in the nineteenth century to suppress 
Māori protests against land sales.  For example the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 
allowed for the arrest of Māori who were defined as rebels, generally defined as those 
who refused to sell, resulting in the confiscation of their land (Ward, 1995). 
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deliberations.  In comparison, our focus is on the drivers behind the 
development of the Tribunal at a particular point in State-Māori relations, 
which we believe is an under-theorised and researched area of the Tribunals 
history and operations. 
 
The State’s response to Māori political dissent 
As the historical record shows, Māori have long contested the ways in 
which the Crown and the New Zealand government have developed policies 
that directly impact on them and their communities, particularly in relation to 
land confiscation and breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi.  As stated earlier, 
most of this activity had been dealt with through the state-dominated justice 
system, as well as numerous petitions made by hapū and iwi to government 
and the Crown.  However, by the late 1960s, the form and nature of Māori 
Treaty-related activity began to change (Morris, 2003; Ward, 1993).  
Spurred by the ethnic reorganisation of other colonised indigenes and 
influenced by the Black civil rights movement of the 1960s, Māori began to 
more actively express their discontent with assimilationist state policies 
since the 1880s (Hill and Bonisch-Brednich, 2007, pp. 166-167; Poata-
Smith, 1996; 2004).  Thus, in 1970 the protest organisation, Ngā Tamatoa 
(Young Warriors) began its career of confrontational politics against the 
New Zealand state (Hazlehurst, 1993).  In 1975 the then Labour Government 
was confronted by the famous Hikoi (Great March) of numerous Māori from 
the far north to the steps of Parliament in Wellington (Walker, 1987).  And 
by the mid 1980s organised Māori activist movements had emerged as a 
potent political force in challenging government’s hegemony over 
State/Māori policy (Spoonley, 1989).   
The impact of the rise of Māori protest activism on government 
policy, cannot be overstated (see Poata-Smith, 1996; 2004).  For example, 
Catalanic (2004) argues that one of the key drivers behind the rise of Māori 
activism was the policy context that predominated in New Zealand for much 
of the twentieth century, one based on assimilating Māori into ‘mainstream 
society’.  To further this policy, government actively denied Māori 
grievances by ignoring Treaty issues, while at the same time upholding the 
Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of the nation via the ‘joining 
together as one, the Crown and Māori’.  This continued, policy-driven denial 
of Treaty justice was instrumental in the radicalisation of Māori Treaty 
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politics.  In relation to the link between Māori activism and the development 
of the Tribunal, Catalanic (ibid, p. 11) states that: 
 
The policy assimilation that characterised New Zealand politics 
and society acted as a constraint to the definition of Māori 
socio-economic problems as connected to Crown injustices 
committed under the Treaty.... [therefore]... the New Zealand 
politico-institutional context... conditioned the way in which 
Māori sought to draw attention to their problems – protest 
activism – that was eventually the most successful factor in 
achieving the desired recognition. 
 
The New Zealand state’s response to the hegemonic threat posed by 
the radicalisation of Māori ethnic politics was swift.  From the mid-1970s 
the state’s policy and administrative response moved from being openly 
assimilationist, to become imbued with the rhetoric of Māori bicultural 
ideology (Tauri, 1998).  Administrative responses included attempts to 
increase public service responsiveness to Māori values, needs and 
aspirations; a new distributive ideal based on the bicultural allocation of 
power and resources; and acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi as a policy 
blue print for reuniting ‘the founding partners of New Zealand’ (Sissons, 
1990).  However, arguably the most substantive response to the counter-
hegemonic activity of Māori was the Waitangi Tribunal. 
 
The Waitangi Tribunal 
The Waitangi Tribunal was established by the third Labour 
Government (1972-1975) with the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 
1975. At this point the Tribunal was given the authority to inquire into and 
make recommendations to the Crown (represented by the Government of the 
day) relating to Māori claims against government actions that they believed 
contravened their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (Catalinac, 2004; 
Gibbs, 2006).  The government’s intentions for the Tribunal in terms of 
process and jurisdiction are summarised by Ward (1993, p. 185) who writes 
that: 
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[I]n future, ‘any Māori’ or group of Māori who considered that 
they were prejudicially affected by any act of the Crown or its 
agents, in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
could bring a claim to a new tribunal, the Waitangi Tribunal.  
The Tribunal would act as a commission of enquiry, with power 
to summon witnesses, investigate widely and make 
recommendations (emphasis ours). 
 
However, despite the authority given to the Tribunal to investigate, 
initially the jurisdiction of the new body were significantly constrained. In 
order to gain Government support for the Tribunal in the first instance, one 
of its chief architects, the late Matiu Rata (Rata, 1989) made a number of 
significant concessions at Cabinet level relating to the powers of the 
proposed forum. For example, the legislation that established the forum 
determined that after a hearing was held with Māori complainants, the 
Tribunal was empowered to only make recommendations to Government on 
how it should respond. However, the Government was not bound by the 
Tribunal’s recommendations and could ignore them at will (Sorrenson, 1995; 
Stokes, 1993). The legislation also restricted the forum to considering claims 
emanating from violations of the Treaty of Waitangi occurring after 1975 
and purposely excluded historical claims. These concessions meant that the 
vast majority of events considered by Māori to represent significant breaches 
of the Treaty contract, sat outside the jurisdiction developed for the new 
entity.   
The restrictions in jurisdiction caused concern amongst some Māori 
commentators.  Ward (1993) relates that as a result few claims were brought 
before the Tribunal.  However, this situation changed with the advent of a 
‘bi-cultural tribunal process’ instigated by Chief Justice Eddie Durie in the 
early 1980s, and the content of initial reports that underlined the extensive 
scope and nature of Māori grievances, and Crown breaches of Māori Treaty 
rights (see the Waitangi Tribunal 1983; 1984).  This, along with what Ward 
(1993, p.186) describes as New Zealand middle class desire to ‘confront the 
historic sources of Māori grievance and to offer redress’, saw these 
jurisdictional restrictions partially lifted with passing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 by the then recently elected Labour 
Government.  The legislation extended the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to enable 
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it to consider Māori claims against violations that took place after the signing 
of the Treaty in 1840 (Gibbs, 2006). 
Despite significant constraints on the initial jurisdiction placed upon 
the Tribunal, arguably little changed after the alterations provided for in the 
1984 legislation, a range of authors (e.g., Robinson, 2002; Walker, 1989 and 
Ward, 1993) claim that the forum represented a significant change in the 
State’s response to Māori Treaty grievances.  In summing up this 
perspective, Catalanic (2004, p. 10) writes that ‘[i]t (the Tribunal) has been 
heralded as marking the beginning of a post-colonial era in New Zealand, in 
which Māori-Pākehā relations were being transformed from Pākehā 
dominance to negotiation towards greater justice, equity and partnership’.  
While undoubtedly the Tribunal signalled a change in formal Government 
process for dealing with Māori grievances, the predominant perspective on 
the drivers behind its formation have a tendency to overemphasise the notion 
that it represented a significant transformation in power relations between 
the state and Māori (see for example, Maaka and Fleras, 2009).  In 
comparison, we argue that a critical analysis focused on the wider socio-
political context developing in New Zealand at the time, demonstrates that 
while the Tribunal represented a unique response, the purpose and goals 
aligned with previous policy: namely continued state control over Māori 
policy in light of changes in Māori grievance politics (see Gibbs, 2006 and 
Byrnes, 2004 for similar perspectives).   
 
Key questions of the paper 
As outlined earlier, this paper focuses on two inter-related questions: 
‘why did the government develop the Waitangi Tribunal at this juncture in 
State/Māori relations’, and ‘what function or purpose did the Tribunal serve 
at this point in State/Māori relations’?  We argue that the answers lie in part 
in the wider changes in capitalist development in New Zealand from a 
Fordist to a Post-Fordist regime of accumulation that began in the mid-to-
late 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s.  In particular, we contend 
that the formation of the Tribunal can be linked to the growing popularity of 
informal justice processes as one mechanism employed by the modern state 
to regulate social discontent and political protest in Post-Fordist contexts.  
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Fordist to Post-Fordist regimes of accumulation and regulation 
Regulation theory is useful for anchoring our examination of the New 
Zealand state’s response to the increasing radicalisation of Māori political 
dissent, as it provides a framework to analyse the changes in the forms of 
regulation of populations and dissent in capitalist economies (Tickell & 
Peck, 1995).  Regulation theory attempts to explain, through an analysis of 
capitalist development, the paradox between capitalism’s inherent tendency 
towards instability and crisis and the constant drive to stabilise around a set 
of institutions, norms and rules that support, or attempt to affect economic 
and social stability (Amin, 1994).  
Filion (2001, pp. 86-87) identifies two concepts at the core of 
regulation theory.  Regime of accumulation describes the organisation of 
society that aid economic activity and growth.  Included in this domain of 
activity are the political institutions, culture and systems of production.  
Mode of regulation refers to the nature of mechanisms that bring society in 
line with the requirements of the sphere of production.  Amin (1994, p.8) 
describes the mode of regulation as the ‘institutions and conventions which 
regulate and reproduce a given accumulation regime through application 
across a wide range of areas, including the law, state policy, political 
practices, industrial codes, governance philosophies, rules of negotiation and 
bargaining, cultures of consumption and social expectations’.  These 
components of society can pattern behaviour in ways that support the 
prevailing regime of accumulation.  They provide the social mores, beliefs 
and behaviours that support capitalist accumulation (Painter and Goodwin, 
1995).  
Due to its contradictory and crisis-ridden tendencies, capital requires 
forms of institutional regulation to supports its continued reproduction and 
legitimacy. Successive phases of capitalist development can be characterised 
and analysed via the combination of regimes of accumulation and regulation 
formed to support capital in that particular epoch (Jessop, 1994).  Each 
regime therefore has distinctive regulatory characteristics and regulation 
theory attempts to explain transformations and differences between phases, 
such as the movement from a Fordist regime to a Post-Fordist regime of 
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accumulation that occurred in many western capitalist societies from the 
immediate post-war period onwards2. 
 
Fordism 
The Fordist regime of accumulation is generally characterised by mass 
production and mass consumption, based upon the assembly line production 
techniques introduced in the United States at the turn of the twentieth 
century by Henry Ford (Lipietz, 1992).  As Wilkes (1993) notes, the concept 
of assembly line production brings with it notions of universalism, 
uniformity, repetition and rationality.  The regulatory forms commonly 
ascribed to Fordism include the welfare state3; the role of trade unions in 
raising consumption standards of working class and public servants; the 
media-inspired interest in mass consumption and the replacement of the 
extended family with the nuclear model as the family formation of modern 
society (Falion, 2001).  The Fordist accumulatory epoch is generally 
considered to have lasted from the early 20th century until the early 1980s 
depending on the particular jurisdiction, at which time the supporting 
regulatory regimes began to lose their effectiveness.  Lipietz (1992) contends 
that crisis developed within Fordism's supposed universal and rational 
system as real wages continued to increase and the cost of fixed capital in 
relation to the total work force also rose, resulting in the retraction of profit 
margins.  This brought forth a new accumulative and regulatory regime, 
Post-Fordism.  
 
Post-Fordism 
In contrast to the Fordist epoch, Post-Fordism is characterised by a 
reduced role in society for trade unions; a sharper division in the working 
class between core and peripheral workers; and a greater flexibility of work 
practices, characterised by diversification, rather than universalism.  The 
Post-Fordist mode of production has been described as involving the 
                                                            
2  See Amin (1994) and Jessop (1995) for discussions about different theoretical 
explanations on the emergence of Post-Fordism. 
3  Lipietz (1986a) writes that the Fordist mode of regulation in Western jurisdictions often 
included a welfare system designed to ensure every wage earner a guaranteed income in 
times of economic hardship, with social legislation covering minimum wage levels and 
collective agreements.  This tends to institutionalise the class struggle by meeting some of 
the needs of workers, whilst allowing capitalist accumulation, including the cheap 
appropriation of labour, to continue.   
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commodification and privatisation of a range of collective services that were 
previously organised by the Fordist state (Aglietta, 1979).  The market 
reforms of the 1980s to mid-1990s in New Zealand showed a decisive move 
towards this type of capital organisation and accumulation, the privatisation 
of public works a clear example of this process (Kelsey, 1993; 1997). 
The move towards a Post-Fordist era of capital accumulation is 
accompanied by the development of different modes of regulation.  As with 
modes of regulation characteristic of previous forms of capital accumulation, 
they provide the means of institutionalising and confining class struggle and 
potential hegemonic crises within state-controlled processes.  These modes 
of regulation will be different from those which characterise the containment 
and control of class and ethnic relations in the Fordist era. 
Despite the existence of the range of regulatory mechanisms listed 
above, crises of capital within the Fordist era brought about the need for new 
and innovative forms of regulation.  The state’s response to the social 
disintegration inherent in the crises of accumulation was to penetrate even 
more deeply into civil society in order to restructure social relations into 
forms appropriate to the emergence of a new, Post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation.  This statement is perhaps at odds with the common portrayal 
of the Post-Fordist state as less regulatory and less involved in civil society 
(see Bonefield and Hollaway, 1991).  Arguably, this portrayal is overstated.  
The rise of Post-Fordism did not see the state withdraw from its regulatory 
position, but instead re-shape itself and seek to control the regulatory process 
in different, less obvious ways than were constructed during the Fordist 
context.  One less obvious form of state regulatory control is the informal 
justice forum, of which the Waitangi Tribunal, during its first decade or 
more of operation, greatly resembled. 
 
Post-Fordist regulation and the rise of informal justice 
Although the informal justice movement began initially during the 
latter part of the Fordist epoch, it was during Post-Fordism that its products 
became key components of the regulatory regime (Hofrichter, 1987).  This 
was due in part to the growing obsolescence and ineffectiveness of Fordist 
state institutions and technologies of control that mediated class and social 
conflict during the earlier epoch (Santos, 1995).  These institutions, 
including the police, courts and child care and protection, while still 
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powerful and coercive, were no longer on their own successful in 
reproducing what Spitzer (1982) calls politically docile populations.   
Arguably, the rise of radical socio-political movements, such as 
feminism and indigenous activism, represented forms of political expression 
that contested the legitimacy of existing modes of justice, and therefore 
regulation, in the developing Post-Fordist context.  These counter-hegemonic 
movements were not easily contained within existing institutional processes 
designed to support a Fordist accumulatory regime, thus prompting the 
development of alternative modes of regulation (Hofrichter, 1987).  We 
contend that informal justice became a key Post-Fordist regulatory response 
in the New Zealand context, and that a primary example of this ‘new form’ 
of regulation was the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Informal justice forums operate within Post-Fordism as pacificatory 
mechanisms, drawing potentially hegemonic activity into state-designed and 
dominated regimes.  The Tribunal, particularly the way it operated 
throughout much of the 1980s, neutralised conflict that could threaten the 
state or capital accumulation by responding to legitimate Māori grievances in 
ways that inhibited their transformation into serious ideological or physical 
challenges to the authority of the state (Santos, 1982).  Abel (1982) notes 
that informal justice institutions of this kind are generally created and 
controlled by the respondents, and rarely if ever by the grievant themselves. 
In order to neutralise conflict, informal mechanisms must be able to 
attract disputants to their processes.  State-centred informal justice seeks to 
achieve this goal by appearing to operate as a neutral arbiter between the 
claimants and the state.  Inducing complainants to submit voluntarily to an 
informal justice regime heightens the chances of their accepting any 
decisions made and believing that ‘justice has been done’, despite the fact 
that the process is often designed to limit the possibility of adverse decisions 
being made against state interests.  This has a neutralising effect on class 
conflict, by denying class antagonisms and appealing to general standards of 
engagement that are designed to promote capital affirming modes of social 
cohesion.  As Selva and Bohm (1987, p. 50) note: 
[t]he residual is the legitimation of state intervention and the 
return to uncontrolled political power, delegalising social 
relations by loosening power from formal controls.  Thus, under 
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the banner of informalism and the rhetoric of personal justice, 
state authority and political control has been partially obscured.   
 
From this brief conceptual outline, it become possible to explain the 
emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal during the rise of Post-Fordist phase of 
capital accumulation in the New Zealand context and to illustrate how 
regulation of Māori grievances and claims has changed in this transitional 
period.  In the following section, the Waitangi Tribunal is examined as a 
form of Post-Fordist regulation, to demonstrate how the informal procedures 
it utilised throughout the 1980s, channelled, then neutralised, the hegemonic 
potentialities of Māori Treaty activism. 
 
The Waitangi Tribunal as a Post-Fordist regulatory body 
 
It could be argued that the Waitangi Tribunal is a belated 
attempt to extend the hegemony of the rule of law over Māori, 
at a time when its legitimacy is most directly under attack        
(Jane Kelsey, 1984). 
 
Chris Wilkes (1993) suggests the Fordist period in New Zealand was 
broadly located in the period 1935 to 1984, otherwise known as the ‘Long 
Boom’ (Nielson 1990, p. 81).  During the 1960s the long boom was also 
sustained by increasing productivity of labour through mass production 
techniques and the rapid expansion of agricultural exports to the world 
economy, while the local economy and the manufacturing sector were 
protected through a range of state subsidies and tariffs (Roper, 1993).  The 
Fordist phase was brought into crises in the late 1960s and early 1970s due 
to a falling rate of profit, rising foreign debt and the shifts in the global 
export markets away from New Zealand produce (ibid.). 
In the move towards Post-Fordist accumulation and regulation in the 
1980s, the Labour government introduced free market policies, collectively 
referred to as ‘Rogernomics’, which sought to restructure the New Zealand 
economy through privatisation of state services and assets4.  Ideologically 
                                                            
4  Rogernomics refers to the plethora of neo-liberal economic and social policies developed 
by Roger Douglas and the Labour government from 1984-1990.  Douglas, the Minister of 
Finance from 1984-1988, argued that social goals and political considerations should be 
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driven by new right economic theory, the process involved the reformation 
of government control over key assets into separate State Owned Enterprises 
that were required to be profit focused.  The enterprises could then be 
privatised and subsequently offered for sale to the private sector.  Resistance 
to these policies came mainly from Māori, who saw the resources under the 
auspices of the enterprises being further alienated to private control, leading 
to potential breaches of their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Kelsey 
(1990, p.1) offers an insight into this effect on Māori articulation of Treaty 
grievances when she argues that: 
The pace and scope of Rogernomics left a politically 
naive and economically illiterate population stunned and 
apathetic.  Significant resistance came from just one quarter.  
Māori movements of the 1970s intensified throughout the 1980s 
as Māori reasserted their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi to 
te tino rangatiratanga, or complete authority over themselves 
and the country's key resources of land, fisheries, waterways 
and minerals.  With determination, and sometimes desperation 
they challenged the government moves to vest in the hands of 
private capital the resources guaranteed to te iwi Māori in the 
Treaty. 
Māori concerns focused upon the fact that by privatising resources, the 
Government - as the Crown’s representative - was potentially divesting itself 
of its Treaty responsibilities and, as result, their Treaty rights.  The interests 
of capital would be supported through legislation, while Māori would remain 
economically and politically destitute, with little or no resources to exercise 
sovereignty over (Kelsey, 1990).  Rising Māori protests challenged the 
legitimacy of the government’s activities in this sphere, and through court 
action they were eventually able to curtail the Government’s ability to 
implement the reforms (Kelsey, 1993).  In order to allow capitalist 
accumulation to continue unimpeded, attempts were made to channel Māori 
activism into new forms of regulation, the most obvious being the Tribunal. 
In the Fordist period, regulation of Māori protests against Treaty 
breaches was maintained firstly by a formal legal system that denied the 
validity of the Treaty, while emphasising parliamentary sovereignty as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
excluded from economic policy.  Douglas and Labour sought to construct a highly 
deregulated economy in New Zealand, driven by market forces (Kelsey, 1997). 
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sole legitimate power in the country.  Secondly, a paternalistic welfare state 
provided rising living standards for both European and Māori.  While Māori 
did not have recognised Treaty rights, they had access to education, health 
and housing support.  However, by the mid 1970s, both the legal and welfare 
systems were proving insufficient for regulating Māori Treaty grievances 
and political activism. This situation necessitated the development of 
alternative forms of regulation, which the state set about constructing 
throughout the late 1970s and into the 1980s (Kelsey, 1990).  It is possible to 
see that the decline of the Fordist mode provided the conditions for the 
emergence of the Tribunal in 1975.  The Fordist state could not fully contain 
Māori concerns for Treaty rights through the formal legal or parliamentary 
systems as it had done up to this point.  As Wilkes (1993. p.205) argues 
‘[d]emands for the revitalisation of the culture and language, and the return 
of wrongly appropriated tribal land, now sought a real answer which the old 
settlements could not produce’. 
Kelsey (1993) contends that in the 1980s the state could respond to 
Māori Treaty activism in two ways.  It could use coercion, as had previous 
governments, with the potential for increasing Māori sense of grievance and, 
therefore, conflict with the state.  Or it could choose the path of passive 
revolution, a term derived from Antonio Gramsci that denotes the ‘inclusion 
of new social groups under the hegemony of the political order without the 
expansion of real political control by the mass of population over politics’ 
(ibid: 234).  The State chose the latter, inducing and encouraging aggrieved 
Māori to seek the Tribunal as neutral arbiter between the conflicted parties. 
Through the Tribunal the State temporarily brought the counter-hegemonic 
activities of Māori within its ambit until the challenge was defused, through 
both real (in terms of limited fiscal settlements), and rhetorical concessions 
(e.g., formal apologies) , and the promise of meaningful ‘change’ in State-
Māori relationships.  By drawing Māori protests off the street and national 
television and into the Waitangi Tribunal (see Gagne, 2009, p. 42), the State 
was largely able to regulate actions that could have presented a barrier to the 
developing Post-Fordist regime of accumulation.  
We are not suggesting that the Tribunal was intentionally created as a 
regulatory body from its inception.  Earlier we argued that the Tribunal was 
created as a forum to hear grievances, a necessary response by the state to 
the developing radicalisation of Māori activism.  Jessop (1991) contends that 
Tauri and Webb 
 
14 
 
the emergence and subsequent dynamic of structures of regulation might be 
endowed with a greater intentionality than is justified.  In the case of the 
Tribunal it would be an exaggeration to reduce its origin merely to the 
formation of a mode of regulation in response to accumulation or ideological 
crises. However, it is possible to view the emergence of the Tribunal as a 
Post-Fordist mode of regulation as a non-intentional, but nonetheless 
focussed strategy, aimed at ensuring state-controlled direction of an already 
emergent structure.  Regulation should be viewed as a complex and 
provisional process mediated through institutions and conducted by social 
forces.  Given these points, the Waitangi Tribunal should be viewed as a 
state-formed regulatory body that assisted the state to institutionalise Māori 
dissent and political activism as part of the Post-Fordist regulatory regime 
that began to emerge and then expand in New Zealand throughout the 1980s. 
For the Tribunal to institutionalise Māori protest and dissent, it had to 
be able to attract Māori claimants to its processes.  The Tribunal developed 
in ways that enabled it to attract claimants by appearing to be more 
responsive to Māori grievances than the formal court system.  The ability of 
the Tribunal to attract claims enhanced as it proactively moved from 
replicating the process of the formal justice system to the ‘informal’ 
formalism of marae protocol.  The changes can be shown by contrasting the 
reaction to the first hearing by the Tribunal and then subsequent hearings 
that were altered to attract Māori claimants. 
The first hearing of the Tribunal was in Auckland on the 30 May 
1977.  The claim was made by a Mr Hawke relating to fishing rights of the 
Ngāti Whātua (Waitangi Tribunal, 1978).  Williams (1989) writes that the 
Tribunal attempted to establish the atmosphere of formal court proceedings, 
and also tried to narrow the claim to one of legal niceties.  Williams (1989) 
and Sharp (1997) also note the choice of location for the hearing, the 
Ballroom of the Hotel Intercontinental, and the processes employed, were 
highly inappropriate for the hearing.  No attempt was made to use Māori 
customs and the chairperson referred to it as a Magistrates Court (Catalinac, 
2004).  From this it is possible to see that the Tribunal in the beginning had 
the formality and processes of the formal justice system.  However, as Sharp 
(1997, p. 77) writes ‘the Māori people for whose benefit it was primarily 
designed did not like its manner of proceeding according to formal, legal, 
Pākehā practice’. 
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The response by claimants to the formality of Tribunal hearings and 
its restricted jurisdiction was clearly shown by the small number of claims to 
go before the Tribunal during the initial years of its operation.  Just fourteen 
claims were lodged in the first nine years of its existence to 1984.  However, 
this changed as the processes and operations of the Tribunal were altered, as 
shown in the Motonui claim.  Lodged in 1982, the Te Atiawa tribe argued 
that the Motonui Synthetic Fuel project would pollute their traditional 
fishing grounds (Waitangi Tribunal, 1989).  Notably, the hearing was held 
on a marae, without formal legal procedures, instead using marae protocol.  
Temm (1990) notes that Pākehā legal formality did not seem appropriate on 
a marae, so it was decided that marae kawa (protocols) would be adopted for 
each hearing.  It was also decided that legal formalities such as paper work 
would be kept to a minimum in order to ensure the Tribunal worked in an 
orderly and efficient manner, but also, because it was important that ‘the 
Waitangi Tribunal be in every sense a people’s court’ (Temm, 1990: 9).  
After this claim, hearings were held on home marae, replacing the 
appearance of legal formalism.   
In 1985, the amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act allowed 
retrospective claims back to 1840, and increased the membership of the 
Tribunal to a Chairperson plus six others, four of whom were to be Māori.  
By using Māori custom, more fully incorporating Māori in its processes, and 
eventually being able to examine historical grievances, the Tribunal was able 
to present itself as a body able to address and resolve Māori claims in an 
‘appropriate manner’.  By the beginning of 1994, claims lodged with the 
Tribunal had increased to 400 (Kneebone, 1994).  Thus, in the period 
covering the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Tribunal arguably transformed 
itself from a formal body of justice, to that of an informal justice forum that 
engaged with Māori on their terms; at least as far as protocol was concerned.  
The Tribunal was able to gain acceptance from Māori by making decisions 
that not only recognised past injustices, but also produced tangible, albeit 
unintended, results.   
Abel (1982) writes that because the state presents itself as the only 
legitimate source of legal authority, other processes, for example 
communitarian justice, require its support to provide the necessary 
legitimacy for their survival.  This was demonstrated in the New Zealand 
context by the 1987 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General case.  
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The 1987 court decision gave the Tribunals interpretation in favour of Māori 
claimants the orthodoxy of informed opinion.  Renwick (1993) argues that 
this had three important effects upon Māori and the Tribunal.  Firstly, the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal for Māori was enhanced by the formal recognition 
of the validity of the forum’s interpretations and deliberations.  Secondly, it 
demonstrated that informalist processes could find in favour of Māori 
interests, and that going to the Tribunal would not be a waste of time or 
resources.  Thirdly, arguably the decision was instrumental in changing the 
character of Māori activism by moving protests from the street to the 
Tribunal process, where many Māori began to believe that justice could now 
be achieved.  Renwick (1993, p.11) underlines the counter-hegemonic 
potentialities of the Tribunal when he contends that during this period in 
Tribunal history, ‘Māori advocacy… moved beyond protest marches to 
hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, the committee rooms of 
parliament and the offices of Ministers of the Crown... The process has 
growing legitimacy in Māori minds’.  
This development had a demonstrable effect on Māori protests during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Protests that were previously loud and 
visible moved from being confrontational to conciliatory (Sharp, 1997; see 
also Gagne, 2009, p. 42).  As a result, grievants (more commonly referred to 
by media and politicians as ‘radicals’) who did not use the path offered by 
the Tribunal had their complaints labelled illegitimate.  Arguably then, a key 
outcome of the Tribunal process was State containment of Māori radicalism 
and the incorporation of Māori political discourse.  Kelsey (1992, p.601) 
underlines this argument when she wrote that: 
 
…those who harbour grievances are persuaded to abandon 
radical measures, such as boycotts or militant action, in favour 
of orderly and peaceful resolution under the protection of 
informal state institutions.  The conflict is redefined, its 
manifestation controlled within state-prescribed limits and the 
demands of the grievants moderated... Continued resort to extra-
legal tactics by other grievants can be discredited by reference 
to those who have accepted the opportunity, which the state has 
provided, to address their concerns responsibly [our emphasis]. 
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In effect, Māori were directed towards a state-sanctioned process 
which worked as an informal justice body independent of the formal system.  
However, while the Tribunal may have become the environment where the 
struggle over Māori claims was contained, ongoing regulation of socio-
political discontent was never absolute.  As Jessop (1991, p.73) writes ‘since 
there are no institutional guarantees that struggles will always be contained 
within these forms and/or resolved in ways that reproduce these forms, the 
stability of an accumulation regime or mode of regulation is always relative, 
always partial, and always provisional’.  So, while Māori gained from the 
Tribunal process in terms of positive claims decisions and successful court 
actions to temporarily halt government legislation, these successes were very 
much unintended consequences of the Tribunals regulatory process and, 
more importantly for our argument, extremely rare.  
According to Merry (1992) state controlled informal justice 
institutions may provide indigenous peoples such as Māori, an opportunity to 
push the boundaries of the imposed regulatory ordering and mould them to 
better suit their needs.  However, despite the contestability of control over 
informal processes, in practice the state can employ a number of tactics to 
maintain or regain control of the regulatory environment, including 
reconstituted legislation; withdrawal of financial support and/or constructing 
new processes and strategies that divert focus away from a domain that may 
threaten state interests begin working in unintended ways.  For example, in 
response to the Tribunal recommending the return of 44 hectares of private 
land in the Te Roroa claim, the Crown passed legislation in 1992 to prevent 
any further recommendations on the return of private land, excepting only 
the 1988 State Enterprises Act in relation to State Owned Enterprises.  One 
reason for this has been the pressure exerted by the Government upon the 
Tribunal against employing their powers under this Act (Gibbs, 2006).  This 
was demonstrated in March 1997, when the Tribunal touted the possibility of 
this section of the Act being used in relation to the Muriwhenua claim.  The 
State’s response was to threaten that such a mandatory ruling would result in 
the limited settlement fund (set under the Fiscal Envelope, see discussion 
below) for all claims collapsing, thereby leaving a significant number of 
claims unresolved.  The Tribunal quickly backed down, recommending only 
that the Crown should enter into direct negotiations with the claimants (see, 
Barlow, 1997 and Hubbard, 1997).   
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Given this example, it is possible to suggest that the Tribunal formed 
the initial basis of a Post-Fordist regulation of Māori claims during the late 
1970s, throughout most of 1980s.  However, the lack of action by both the 
fourth Labour and the following National Government in acting upon the 
Tribunal’s recommendations throughout this period, resulted in rising 
dissatisfaction from Māori with the claims processes by the early 1990s 
(Kneebone, 1994).  It is at this point that government policy was 
reformulated into a claims resolution process based on direct negotiation 
with iwi.  The first major pan-tribal Treaty settlement extinguished Māori 
fishing rights in exchange for a limited 1989 settlement, and a share in 
fishing assets in the Sealords company in 1992, known as the Sealords deal.5  
Iwi were then encouraged to compete for a limited land claims settlement 
fund, labelled the Fiscal Envelope.  Those iwi who chose to participate 
would have their outstanding Treaty claims extinguished in exchange for a 
limited financial settlement, while iwi that refused the envelope process were 
unlikely to receive compensation.  The regulatory environment that had been 
initiated through the Tribunal and dominated by it, was overtaken by the 
Fiscal Envelope process, and thereafter by the Government favouring the 
strategy of direct negotiation with iwi claimants.  This change in the 
regulatory environment signalled the beginning of the end of the Tribunal as 
a significant process in the state’s regulation of Māori dissent, in particular 
those associated with Treaty grievances6. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of the Waitangi Tribunal can be explained by the 
development of a Post-Fordist mode of regulation.  The historical basis of 
                                                            
5  Under the terms of this agreement, the government provided Māori with 150 million 
dollars towards purchasing a half share in the Sealords company, with Brieley 
Investments as the joint venture partner.  By agreeing to this deal, Māori effectively 
signed away their commercial fishing rights as guaranteed under the various articles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Webb, 1998). 
6  Joseph (2000: 61) posits another possible explanation for the eventually sidelining of the 
Tribunal, and for Government attempts to nullify its powers: ‘[t]he Tribunal’s work 
evolved in the midst of a collision between two contradictory forces: on the one hand, a 
genuine political will to improve the situation for Māori; on the other, a new commitment 
to neo-liberal economic policies that transformed state structures and undermined the 
capacity to fulfil the promises generated by that political will’.  Arguably, the Tribunal’s 
willingness to even signal the possible use of its powers, thereby effecting Crown control 
over resource allocation, was a potential stumbling block to the neo-liberal idea (see also 
Kelsey, 1993).   
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Māori Treaty grievances emanated largely from the alienation of land that 
occurred during the colonial context and throughout the 20th century.  
Legislation supported this acquisition and throughout the pre-Fordist and 
Fordist eras, the state was able to regulate Māori protests either by ignoring 
them or channelling them towards formal, legal processes, where grievances 
were less likely to interrupt the processes of capital accumulation.   
The Tribunal emerged during a crumbling Fordist regime of 
accumulation and the rise of Post-Fordism in the New Zealand context.  The 
establishment of the Tribunal can be understood as a consequence of the 
transition to the new mode of accumulation and the concomitant need to 
ensure the continuation of a capital friendly social order.  However, the 
development of the Tribunal should not be viewed as the direct result of 
planning by certain interest groups to regulate or control Māori claims.  The 
analysis presented here shows the non-intentional development of the 
Tribunal into a mode of informalist regulation, where strategic conduct by 
the State may have only been used to impose coherence and direction on an 
already emergent structure.   
The increased use of informal procedures by the Tribunal throughout 
the 1980s can also be seen as a change in the mode of regulation from 
Fordist to Post-Fordist regimes, where dissent is channelled into an 
institution that defines the limits of the justice that can be dispensed.  The 
less formal procedures developed by the Tribunal attracted Māori claimants, 
which incorporated their activism within the state-controlled apparatus.  
Thus, the Tribunal functioned as a Post-Fordist mode of regulation by 
incorporating Māori grievances in ways that nullified their potential to 
threaten the hegemonic legitimacy of the New Zealand state.  
The final chapter in the role of the Waitangi Tribunal as a key 
component in the Post-Fordist regulation of Māori socio-political dissent is 
now playing out.  Since the mid 1990s, the position of the Tribunal in the 
regulatory hierarchy was supplanted by the Fiscal Envelope (Robinson, 
2002), with its cap on resourcing of Treaty claims, and more contemporarily 
by the favour shown by all participants to the strategy of direct negotiation.  
This is not to say the Tribunal is totally irrelevant, as it remains important to 
some iwi and other Māori organisations for the role it plays in the 
preparation of Treaty claims.  However, its part in the process of regulation 
and control of Māori activism has been usurped by the recognition by senior 
Tauri and Webb 
 
20 
 
politicians of the ideological and fiscal benefits to be had from taking direct 
control of State-iwi engagement.   
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